Pakistan’s strategic position, too, sharply limits its room for manoeuvre. The 2025 defence agreement with Saudi Arabia creates expectations of alignment in the event of escalation, a scenario fraught with domestic risk. Pakistan’s sectarian landscape has been volatile in the past, and any overt positioning in a Saudi-Iran confrontation could inflame tensions.

At the same time, Pakistan cannot afford an adversarial relationship with Iran. Its western border is already strained due to instability in Afghanistan. Adding hostility with Tehran would create a two-front security challenge, even as relations with India remain tense. The prospect of being encircled by unstable or hostile neighbours is strategically untenable.

It is within these overlapping constraints that Pakistan’s diplomatic activism must be seen. Islamabad functioned less as a formal mediator, more a facilitator, maintaining communication between adversaries and coordinating with regional actors. The objective was limited but clear: Prevent escalation to a point where Pakistan would be forced into choices it cannot sustain.

A critical enabler of this role has been Pakistan’s working relationship with the current US administration. Islamabad has maintained close contact with Washington, and its leadership has established a degree of trust with President Donald Trump and his inner circle. For Washington, Pakistan offers utility as a state able to engage with Tehran while remaining broadly aligned with US strategic interests. This convergence created space for Pakistan to act as a conduit at a time when direct US-Iran engagement remains fraught. For Pakistan, this alignment reinforces relevance in Washington at a time of shifting US priorities and signals to Gulf partners that Islamabad remains a dependable interlocutor. It also allows Pakistan to balance competing relationships without making explicit commitments that could prove costly.

Yet, the limits of this role are evident. Pakistan lacks the leverage to shape outcomes decisively. It can facilitate dialogue but cannot enforce compliance. This is where China’s role becomes significant, as a regional power with the capacity to influence Tehran, complementing Pakistan’s efforts. The ceasefire itself remains fragile, contingent on calculations in Washington, Tehran, and other regional capitals. Should the process unravel, Pakistan risks being associated with a failed diplomatic effort without having had the means to determine its trajectory. There is also the question of overextension. Engaging in high-stakes diplomacy in a volatile region carries risks, particularly for a state with constrained resources and multiple internal challenges.

In India, the initial reaction has oscillated between scepticism and dismissal before giving way to a more measured recognition of Pakistan’s role. Ideally, such mediation could have been a joint endeavour, given that both India and Pakistan remain vulnerable to the same energy shocks. But this is a deeply fractured neighbourhood where rational coordination is often overtaken by nationalist rhetoric and short-term political imperatives.

Domestically, the ceasefire has generated a rare moment of public affirmation, celebrating Pakistan’s growing stature at the global level. For now, this episode appears to have steadied the hybrid regime, lending it a degree of political oxygen amid tough economic conditions.

Whether this moment translates into sustained diplomatic relevance will depend less on Pakistan’s intentions and more on the durability of peace in a structurally volatile region. This was diplomacy under constraint, and its endurance will hinge on whether a fragile pause can resist the structural pull of another war, including Israel’s willingness to allow diplomacy the space to work.

The writer is a distinguished lecturer at the City University of New York and editor at large at The Friday Times and Naya Daur Media